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Recent Decisions
Criminal Law - Common Thief Statute Upheld. State
v. Cherry, ...... Md ....... 167 A. 2d 328 (1961). Defendant was
indicted under 3 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, § 558, for being
a common thief. This provision, in part, authorizes police
to arrest a person -theyknow, or have good reason to believe,
to be a common thief. The trial court, in granting a motion
to dismiss the indictment, found the statute to be unconstitutional. In reversing, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the statute was constitutional, saying that the word
"common" when used in a penal statute such as § 558 has
a technical and well-established meaning in law which
sets an ascertainable standard of guilt. The Court indicated
that several authorities show that the word "common" had
at the time § 558 was enacted, and has now, a technical and
well-known meaning in law. In State v. Russell, 14 R.I.
506 (1884), defendant was convicted of being a "common
night walker"; in Con. v. McNamee, 112 Mass. 285 (1873),
defendant was convicted of being a "common drunkard";
in Levine v. State, 110 N.J.L. 467, 166 A. 300 (1933), defendant was convicted of being a "common burglar." In
the first two cases above, the constitutionality of the respective statutes was not attacked, but in the Levine case,
the statute was upheld after being challenged on constitutional grounds. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939), a penal statute was held unconstitutional because
the word "gang" was not defined in the statute and had no
technical meaning in law. The case of World v. State, 50
Md. 49 (1878), which did not consider the constitutionality
of § 558, held that the jury must be satisfied that the defendant is a thief by practice and habit, to warrant a conviction
under the statute.
Generally, the courts hold that if penal statutes employ
words or phrases of a technical meaning in law, they are
sufficiently certain so as not to violate due process. Connally
v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). For Maryland
cases in accord see Miedzinski v. Landman, 218 Md. 3, 145
A. 2d 220 (1958); Glickfield v. State, 203 Md. 400, 101 A.
2d 229 (1953); State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 32 A. 2d 477
(1943). See also 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), § 203;
Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of PersonalCondition,
66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203 (1953).
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Evidence - False Claim Not Within Attorney-Client
Privilege. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v.
Hamilton, 340 S.W. 2d 218 (Ky. 1960). Plaintiff's barn was
covered by a fire insurance policy issued by defendant
company. The policy contained a provision which suspended liability while tobacco was being "fired." After
plaintiff's barn was destroyed by fire, he consulted certain attorneys who refused to bring suit when plaintiff
admitted the fire occurred during the suspension period.
Plaintiff brought suit by other attorneys and defendant
attempted to introduce as evidence the communication between plaintiff and the first attorneys. The trial court
sustained plaintiff's objection on the ground the communcation was privileged. In reversing, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals held that a communication with an attorney
previously consulted in a matter is not privileged when the
client persists in a suit after having been informed by that
attorney that it clearly would be based on a dishonest cause
of action.
The rule that a communication between an attorney and
client is privileged is well recognized. Chew v. Farmers'
Bank of Maryland, 2 Md. Ch. 231 (1848); 8 WIGMORE, EviDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), § 2285. However, communication by
a client to an attorney which will aid the client in establishing a false claim is an abuse of their relation, and therefore
the privilege does not attach. In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105
A. 2d 395 (1954); Sawyer v. Stanley, 241 Ala. 39, 1 So. 2d
21 (1941); UNiFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 26 (2). For
other Maryland cases involving the attorney-client privilege
generally, see Benzinger v. Hemler, 134 Md. 581, 107 A.
355 (1919) ; Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909).

See also 8

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

(3rd ed. 1940), § 2298;

McCoRMcIK, EVIDENCE (1954), § 99. Cases are collected in
125 A.L.R. 508 (1940).

Insurance - "Loading" Clause Of Auto Liability Policy
Covers Death By Accidental Discharge Of Shotgun. Allstate Insurance Company v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893
(E.D. Mich. 1961). The insured, while standing twentyfive feet to the rear of his automobile, was ejecting shells
from his shotgun preparatory to placing the weapon in
the automobile. He slipped on the icy ground, and, while
he was attempting to control his fall, the gun discharged
and killed decedent who was sitting in the automobile.
Plaintiff insurer, joining insured and decedent's admin-
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istratrix, sought a declaratory judgment as to nonliability
under an automobile liability policy. The policy provided
for compensation for bodily injury ". . . arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading, of the owned automobile. . . ." On motions for
summary judgment the District Court, finding no Michigan
decision interpreting the scope of the "loading and unloading" clause, adopted the "complete operation" doctrine
and held for the defendants.
In interpreting such "loading and unloading" clauses,
more common to commercial than to private vehicles, the
courts have developed two views on the scope of coverage.
The "complete operation" test adopted in the instant case,
representing the majority view, contemplates that loading
commences when the items to be transported leave their
original location, and, conversely, that unloading does not
cease until they have actually reached their final destination toward which the transportation by automobile was
a part. Raffel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 141 Conn. 389,
106 A. 2d 716 (1954). Since by this test there is no distinction between "loading" and its incident preparatory
activities, the insured was given coverage in the instant
case. The alternate, more restrictive view, is represented
by the "coming to rest" doctrine. This rule contemplates
that "loading" covers the period between the last resting
place of the article and its placement in the automobile,
and "unloading" covers from its removal to the first resting
place. In the instant case since the insured was at rest with
the gun, there would have been no coverage under this
theory. No Maryland case has been found on point, but the
Fourth Circuit in American Auto Ins. Co. v. Master Bldg.
Supply & Lbr. Co., 179 F. Supp. 699 (D.C. Md. 1959) believed
that Maryland would adopt the "complete operation" test.
In that case the insured company delivered sheetrock
which four hours later fell in the purchaser's store causing injury. The insurer was denied a declaratory judgment
as to nonliability. For comprehensive discussion and cases
see Risjord, Loading and Unloading, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 903
(1960); 160 A.L.R. 1259 (1946).

Motor Vehicles - No Appeal From Unsatisfied Claim
And Judgment Award. Simpler v. State of Maryland, to
use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 165 A. 2d 464 (1960). Plaintiff's
decedent was killed by the negligent operation of an automobile by one Simpler. In a wrongful death action, plain-
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tiff got a judgment for $23,956.98 against Simpler, who
however, was uninsured. The judgment being unsatisfied,
plaintiff, pursuant to 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 , §§ 150179, filed a claim with the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund and received an award for the statutory maximum
of $10,000 (less $100 as specified by § 162), plus costs and
interest. The State appealed on the ground that the lower
court should not have been granted interest and costs over
and above the maximum amount. The Maryland Court of
Appeals held, in dismissing the appeal, that the statute,
which specified no right of appeal, conferred on the circuit
courts only a special and limited jurisdiction from which
no appeal lies, where that jurisdiction is not exceeded.
The basis for the holding is that where a statute confers
a special or limited jurisdiction to be exercised in a particular mode, and not according to the common law, no
appeal lies unless expressly provided for by that statute.

2

POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE

(5th ed. 1925), § 826; 2

M.L.E., Appeals, § 23. In Johnson v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 76 A. 2d 736 (1950), it was held that
protesting property owners had no right of appeal to the
Court of Appeals from an adverse order of the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County acting as an appellate court
in reviewing an order of the Board of Zoning Appeals,
where the relevant public local laws contained no provision
for such appeal.
In disposing of the State's contention that where the
lower court exceeds the authority conferred by the statute,
an appeal will lie, Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196
Md. 400, 76 A. 2d 736 (1950), the Court said that the lower
court had not exceeded its authority, because the phrase
in § 162, "exclusive of interest and costs," means that the
interest and costs could be computed over and above the
statutory maximum. In accord, Lindsay v. Boles, 61 N.J.
Super. 516, 161 A. 2d 324 (1960); Pistoria v. Buckowski,
46 N.J. Super. 495, 134 A. 2d 830 (1957); Rall v. Schmidt,
104 N.W. 2d 305 (N.D., 1960).

Practice-Return Receipt Unnecessary In Substituted
Service On Foreign Corporations. Speir v. Robert C. Herd
& Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (Md. 1960). Defendant, a Delaware
corporation, committed a tort in Maryland. Defendant, although doing business in Maryland, had not appointed a
resident agent as required by 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23,
§ 90. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in the United
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States District Court for the District of Maryland and
served process on the State Department of Assessments
and Taxation. Defendant actually received notice of the
suit but filed a motion to quash the return of service on
the ground that 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §§ 97, 98, pertaining to substituted service on foreign corporations, was
unconstitutional, primarily because it does not provide for
the securing of a return receipt, as does the Non-Resident
Motor Vehicles Statute, 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66Y, § 115.
The District Court, in denying the motion to quash, held
that the form of service provided for in the statute satisfies
due process in that it is reasonably calculated to bring
notice of pending suits to the attention of foreign corporations. The District Court indicated that no cases had been
found which require as a prerequisite to substituted service
on foreign corporations, the securing of a return receipt.
The Court noted a contrary ruling in an unreported opinion
of the Baltimore City Court, dealing with §§ 97, 98, Sheet
Metal Fabrications,Inc. v. Newcomb Detroit Co., Docket
91, p. 849, which held those sections unconstitutional because they did not provide for sufficient notice in all cases,
i.e., where the mailing address of the foreign corporation
was not on file with the Commission, and its place of incorporation was unknown.
See further, Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutto, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See also,
Reiblich, Jurisdiction in Maryland Courts Over Foreign
Corporations Under the Act of 1937, 3 Md. L. Rev. 35, 72
(1938), where the author, in discussing §§ 107-108 of MD.
LAWS 1937, Ch. 504, which were substantially similar to
the present provisions, 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, §§ 97, 98,
indicated that those provisions for notice did not appear to
raise any valid constitutional objections.

Taxation - Sale of Surplus War Plant Subject To State
Sales Tax. Comptroller v. Kaiser Corp., 223 Md. 384, 164
A. 2d 886 (1960). An agency of the federal government
sold an aluminum extrusion plant to plaintiff. State sales
and use taxes were paid by plaintiff on certain heavy machinery involved in the sale. Plaintiff sought a refund
which was denied by the Comptroller. The Court of Appeals, in upholding the Comptroller's action, held (the
Chief Judge dissenting), that under 3 MD. CODE (1951),
Art. 81, §§ 321 and 322(e) (§§ 325 and 326(e) of the 1957
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the sale was not exempt as a "casual or isolated"
one and that the machinery was tangible personal property.
The Court said that, although the government is not in the
business of selling, the act of selling was enough to bring
the transaction within the statute, and that this was
merely one of a long series of war surplus transactions
which was not exempt as a "casual or isolated" sale. As to
plaintiff's contention that the machinery was no longer
personal property, the Court cited Anne Arundel Co. v.
Sugar Ref. Co., 99 Md. 481, 58 A. 211 (1904), to the effect
that the doctrine of fixtures had never been imported into
the law of taxation. The dissent felt that the sale should
have come within the exemption of a "casual or isolated"
sale, because of the incongruity of equating prior sales of
surplus mittens, blankets, etc., which would be subject to
the tax, with the sale of heavy machinery constituting an
integral part of an entire industrial plant.
Plaintiff relied on Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208 (1949), where it was
held that the sale of a surplus steel plant by the government was not subject to the Utah sales tax. The majority
in the instant case distinguished the Geneva case as having been decided on the basis that the Utah legislature had
not intended to tax such a complex transaction involving
the sale of both real and personal property, because of the
difficulty of allocating a portion of the price to the tangible
personal property. Cf. Comp. of Treas. v. Thompson Tr.
Corp., 209 Md. 490, 121 A. 2d 850 (1955).
CODE),

Torts - Landowner Liable For Injury Resulting From
Dangerous Artificial Condition. Moore v. Standard Paint
& Glass Co. of Pueblo, ...... Colo ....... 358 P. 2d 33 (1960).
A former basement, some nine feet below street level and
adjacent to plaintiff's building, was converted by defendant
into an open commercial parking lot. A heavy rain resulted in flooding of the excavation to a level of about
eight feet. Plaintiff brought suit for damages to goods in
its basement caused by water seepage from accumulations
on defendant's lot. The lower court found defendant negligent in permitting the excavation to remain open for more
than four years. The Supreme Court of Colorado held,
three justices dissenting, that defendant was liable for the
damage caused by the water which had entered plaintiff's
building because of the excavation being flooded. The
majority of the court felt that defendant was under an
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affirmative duty not to permit its land to remain in an
altered state where a condition was created, the natural
and foreseeable result of which would cause injury to
adjacent property.
Jurisdictions, including Maryland, which have been
confronted with the issue, have recognized liability for
allowing a dangerous artificial condition to exist on one's
premises; Ettl v. Land & Loan Co., 122 N.J.L. 401, 5 A. 2d
689 (1939); Frenkil v. Johnson, 175 Md. 592, 3 A. 2d 479
(1938). In the Frenkil case, a suit for personal injuries
sustained by flying debris when leaking gas on defendant's
property caused an explosion, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that once a landowner knows or should know of the
danger of an articifical condition and fails to exercise care
in alleviating it, he may be liable to persons outside the
land for injuries. For a general discussion of the reasonable use of one's property as a defense which may be asserted by the landowner, see 17 Col. L. Rev. 383 (1917).

See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956)
§ 27.19; PROSSER, HAMBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (2nd ed.
1955) § 75; 2 RESTATEMENT, LAW OF TORTS (1934) § 364.
Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur Applicable To Tire Blowout.
Simpson v. Gray Lines Co., ...... Or ....... 358 P. 2d 516 (1961).
Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's bus, was injured when
a tire blew out and the bus overturned. The Supreme
Court of Oregon held that due to the high degree of care
owed by a common carrier to its passengers, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, but that it was not
error to instruct the jury that plaintiff was entitled merely
to an inference that the carrier was negligent. The court
distinguished the cases involving actions against private
automobile owners, where the courts normally refuse to
apply res ipsa loquitur to tire blowouts, Powlowski v.
Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932), on the ground
that a common carrier has an extraordinary duty to inspect its equipment and maintain it in a safe condition.
Although the cases establish no clear trend, the doctrine
has heretofore been applied to accidents resulting from
tire blowouts on common carriers. In Greyhound Corp. v.
Brown, 269 Ala. 520, 113 So. 2d 916 (1959), the court ruled
that where a wreck was caused by a tire blowout, res ipsa
loquitur applied, and placed the burden on the defendant
to show that there was no negligence in the operation and
maintenance of the bus. However, in Cox v. Wilson, 267
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S.W. 2d 83, 44 A.L.R. 2d 830 (Ky. 1954), the court refused
to apply res ipsa loquitur to a situation similar to that in
the instant case.
The Court of Appeals, in Baltimore and P.R. Co. v.
Swan, 81 Md. 400, 32 A. 175 (1895), although not discussing res ipsa loquitur, approved an instruction to the effect
that proof that plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's
train, that there was an accident, and that she was injured,
gave rise to a presumption that defendant was negligent.
The Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply to the collision of a taxicab with an
automobile, where plaintiff was a passenger in the taxicab
and asleep at the time of the collision and the evidence
showed that his injury might have been caused either by
the taxi driver's negligence or by the act of the other
driver. Klan v. Security Motors, 164 Md. 198, 164 A. 235
(1933). See 4 M.L.E., Carriers, § 84; Kaiser, Pleading Negligence in Maryland - Res Ipsa Loquitur as a Rule of
Pleading, 11 Md. L. Rev. 102 (1950); Farinholt, Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 10 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1949); Thomsen, Presumptions
and Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases in Maryland, 3 Md. L. Rev. 285 (1939); PROssER, TORTS (2d ed.
1955) § 42; 44 A.L.R. 2d 835 (1954).

Trade Regulation - Corporation Cannot Conspire With
Its Unincorporated Division. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F. 2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Plaintiff filed suit against Columbia Broadcasting System, one
of its unincorporated divisions, and certain officers of said
division, charging them with conspiring to restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
(1951) § 1. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one judge dissenting, held that CBS, its unincorporated division, and its employees were incapable of
conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman
Act, since in order to constitute a conspiracy there must
be two or more persons or entities. The court indicated
that CBS, even though a corporation, could no more conspire with itself than a private individual could conspire
with himself.
The majority opinion relied heavily on the case of
Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F. 2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. den. 345 U.S. 925 (1953), which held
that while a corporation could conspire with its subsidiaries
(which were separate corporate entities) to restrain trade
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in violation of the Sherman Act, it could not conspire with
its employees. The majority in the instant case used this
rationale in holding that a corporation could not conspire
with its unincorporated division.
The dissent cited Schine Chain Theatres v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), which held that a parent company and its subsidiaries could conspire to violate the
provisions of the Sherman Act, and United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), in which the Court said that
common ownership and control could not protect corporate
conspirators from prosecution for violations of the Sherman
Act. By analogy, the dissent felt that CBS would be
capable of conspiring with an unincorporated division
since it is "as separate and distinct an organization as a
wholly-owned subsidiary." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, 607.
In Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co.,
94 F. Supp. 388 (Md. 1950), aff'd. 189 F. 2d 797 (4th Cir.
1951), the District Court for Maryland ruled that where
the activities of two theatre corporations were managed
solely by the same person, there was no basis for charging
them with conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
The court indicated that there could only be a conspiracy
if the two corporations had acted in concert through two or
more officers or agents. The Maryland Court of Appeals
has recognized that one person alone can not be guilty of
a conspiracy, Hurwitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 9 A. 2d 575
(1952).
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